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Notes Introduction 1 In his long plea in favour of laughter as a means of refuting ridiculous errors, in Letter XI, of Les Provinciales, Pascal, after quoting Augustine, Jerome and Tertullian in support of his contention, argues that saints may and do laugh at human error. "Je m'assure, mes pères," he says, "que ces examples sacrés suffisent pour faire entendre que ce n'est pas une conduite contraire à celle des saints, de rire des erreurs et des égarements des hommes." 2 Evidently the Bishop of Tasmania (the Right Rev. J. E. Mercer, D.D.) as a modern Anglo-Saxon, felt the same impulse as Chesterton; for in an article in the Hibbert Journal (vol. 9, No. 34, Jan., 1911), after painstakingly purging laughter of all malice, cynicism, pride and malevolence, he tries to prove that God himself has a sense of humour. 3 Esquisse d'une Philosophie (Paris, 1840, tome 3, livre IX, chap. II, p. 371), "Qui pourrait se figurer le Christ riant?" 2 Sydney Smith notices this. He says (op. cit.): no man would laugh to see a little child fall; and he would be shocked to see such an accident happen to an old man, or a woman, or to his father." 3 References are given in connexion with the more detailed account of Voltaire's views in chapter II. 4 See Collected Writings of Thomas de Quincey (A. & C. Black, London), vol. I, p. 25. Speaking of "'readers not sufficiently masters of a language to bring the true pretensions of a work to any test of feeling," he says they "are for ever mistaking for some pleasure conferred by the writer what is in fact the pleasure naturally attached to the sense of a difficulty overcome." In a footnote de Quincey adds: "There can be no doubt that this particular mistake has been a chief cause of the vastly exaggerated appreciation of much that is mediocre in Greek literature." See also vol. IV, p. 26, for a similar remark. See also vol. X, pp. 220–203, when, after a similar thrust at readers of foreign literature, he concludes: "They mistake for a pleasure yielded 5 Extracted from the Daily Mail, January 29th, 1927. 6 See G. J. Romanes' Animal Intelligence (edit., 1882), pp. 487 and 490, where Miss Romanes evidently found laughter disliked by a monkey. 2 The Defence of Poesie (1594). 3 Quoted from L. Dugas, Psychologie du Rire (Paris, 1902). "Rien ne porte davantage à rire qu'une disproportion surprenante entre ce qu'on attend et ce qu'on voit." 4 See note 1 (Introduction) and note 30 below. 5 Dictionnaire Philosophique (Edition Touquet, Paris, 1822, vol. VIII, pp. 66–67): "Les raisonneurs ont prétendu que le rire naît de l'orgeuil, qu'on se croit supérieur à celui dont on rit. Il est vrai que l'homme, qui est un animal risible, est aussi un animal orgueilleux; mais la fierté ne fait pas rire; un enfant qui rit de tout cœur ne s'abandonne point à ce plaisir, parce qu'il se met au-dessus de ceux qui le font rire," etc. 6 Preface to L'Enfant Prodigue (Paris, edition, 1829, vol. 8): "Dans le rire il entre toujours de la gaieté, incompatible avec le mépris et l'indignation." 7 Ibid.: "J'ai cru remarquer aux spectacles qu'il ne s'élève jamais de ces éclats de rire universels qu'à l'occasion d'une méprise. . . . Arlequin ne fait guère rire que quand il se méprend." 8 Ibid.: "Je n'ai jamais vu ce qui s'appelle rire de tout cœur, soit aux spectacles, soit dans la société, que dans des cas approchants de ceux dont je viens de parler." 9 Op. cit. 10 Lectures on the English Comic Writers, Essay 1. 11 Ibid. 12 Komik und Humor (Leipzig, 1898). 13 La Grande Encyclopédie, vol. 28, article, "Rire": — "Quand un objet d'un côté est absurde, et de l'autre trouve une place toute marquée dans une catégorie familière, la pensée éprouve comme une secousse spasmodique: c'est le rire." 14 The World as Will and Idea (translated by Haldane and Kemp, vol. I, p. 76). His original words are: "Das Lachen entsteht jedesmal aus nichts Anderem, als aus der plötzlich wahrgenommenen Inkongruenz zwischen einem Begriff und den realen Objekten, die durch ihn, in irgend einer Beziehung, gedacht worden waren." 15 This and many other examples are to be found in chapter 8 of vol. II of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung ("Zur Theorie 16 Vorlesungen über Aesthetik, Berlin, 1835, Part III, chapter III, p. 534. Hegel's original words are: "Ueberhaupt lässt sich nichts entgegengesetzteres ausfinden, als die Dinge worüber die Menschen lachen. Das Plattste und Abgeschmackteste kann sie dazu bewegen, und oft lachen sie ebensosehr über das Wichtigste und Tiefste, wenn sich nur irgend eine ganz unbedeutende Seite davon zeigt, welche mit ihrer Gewohnheit und täglichen Anschauung in Widerspruch steht. Das Lachen ist dann nur eine Aeusserung der wohlgefälligen Klugheit, ein Zeichen, dass sie auch so weise seyen, solch einen Kontrast zu erkennen, und sich darüber zu wissen. Eben so giebt es ein Gelächter des Spottes, des Hohnes, der Verzweiflung u.s.f." 17 Kritik der Urteilskraft (Leipzig, 1880, book II, para. 54, p. 176): "Es muss in allem, was ein lebhaftes erschütterndes Lachen erregen soll, etwas Widersinniges sein (woran also der Verstand an sich kein Wolgefallen finden kann). Das Lachen ist ein Affect aus der plötzlichen Verwandlung einer gespannten Erwartung in nichts." As an example he tells the story of an heir who, wishing to do his deceased benefactor right well at his funeral, complains that he can hardly succeed in his endeavour, as the more he pays the funeral mutes to appear mournful the more cheerful they become. Another example is a story told by a wag to cap that about a man whose hair turned grey overnight through worry: A merchant, returning from India to Europe, after having amassed a fortune abroad, was obliged, owing to a storm; to throw all his wealth overboard, and he was so grieved that his wig turned white in a night. 18 Essays (vol. II, p. 452), "The Physiology of Laughter." Spencer's precise words are: "As above shown, laughter naturally results only when consciousness is unawares transferred from great things to small — only when there is what we may call a descending incongruity." 19 Letters and Social Aims, "The Comic." 19a Book I, chap. IV, "Characteristics." 20 See Max Eastman, The Sense of Humour, p. 186. 21 Revue Philosophique (Paris, 1893, No. 8, p. 114): "Le sourire avec lequel on accueille un ami, dont s'accompagnent les paroles affectueuses, et qui parfois les remplace, ou celui de l'homme qui parvient à la fin d'une tâche difficile, sont également la marque naturelle d'une augmentation de la liberté." 22 Ibid., p. 117: "Au contraire, tout ce qui rompt cette régularité, cette uniformité, sans nous effrayer toutefois, sans nous causer aucun mal et sans faire souffrir personne, nous fait rire ou nous y dispose." 23 Ibid., p. 118: "Le rire parait être la suite d'une sorte de choc 24 Ibid., p. 121. 25 The Psychological Review (New York, 1894, vol. I, pp. 558–559), art., "The Theory of Emotion." See also Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will (edit. 1899, p. 261) for a similar idea. 26 Quoted from L. Dugas (op. cit., p. 4): "Le rire se produit dans des conditions si hétérogènes et si multiples — sensations physiques, joie, contraste, surprise, bizarrerie, étrangeté, bassesses, etc. — que la réduction de toutes causes à une reste bien problématique." 27 See Laughter (English translation by Cloudesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell), pp. 8–9. 28 Ibid., p. 20. 29 Ibid., p. 135. On p. 136, Bergson says: "In laughter we always find an unavowed intention to humiliate and consequently to correct our neighbour, if not in his will, at least in his deed." 30 The whole of Bergson's theory of the function of laughter is really implicit in Pascal's eleventh Provinciale. It is also implicit in Demetrius of Alexandria's advice that one should use laughter in rebukes against luxury and high living; while in Swift's contribution to The Intelligencer (No. 3), written in 1728, Bergson would have found a modern treatment of the same idea, almost as elaborate as his own. Swift here speaks of satire as of something "which, instead of lashing, laughs men out of their Follies and Vices." And he adds: "And, although some Things are too serious, solemn, or sacred to be turned into Ridicule, yet the Abuses of them are certainly not; since it is allowed that corruptions in Religion, Politicks, and Law, may be proper Topicks for this kind of Satyr." But in the next passage, he anticipates the whole of Bergson's theory of the function of laughter. "There are two ends," he says, "that men propose in writing Satyr; one of them less noble than the other, as regarding nothing further than the private Satisfaction, and Pleasure of the Writer; but without any View towards personal malice: The other is a publick spirit, prompting Men of Genius and Virtue, to mend the World as far as they are able. And as both these Ends are innocent, so the latter is highly commendable. With regard to the former, I demand, whether I have not as good a Title to laugh, as Men have to be ridiculous; and to expose Vice, as another Besides, we have only to recall the way our nurses used to incite our brothers and sisters to laugh at us when we were doing anything silly or naughty, to see how thoroughly obvious Bergson's theory of the social use of laughter is. But to regard it, as he does, as the one function of laughter, is, of course, absurd. That is, among other reasons, why, although Bergson sees a sinister element in laughter, we have placed him in the section of those who have made a superficial examination of the problem. 31 Schopenhauer, who did not make nearly such an important point of the humiliating effect of laughter as Bergson does, at least saw the necessity of explaining why laughter does humiliate, and although his explanation is inadequate, he ingeniously makes it fit in with his general theory of laughter. He says (in chap. 8 of vol. II of the Welt als Wille und Vorstellung): "The fact that laughter of others at the things we do, or seriously say, offends us so acutely, is due to our recognition that their laughter expresses that there is some conspicuous incongruity between our ideas and objective reality." His original words are: "Dass das Lachen Anderer über Das, was wir thun oder ernstlich sagen, uns so empfindlich beleidigt, beruht darauf, dass es aussagt, zwischen unsern Begriffen und der objektiven Realität sei eine gewaltige Inkongruenz." 32 For a careful and reliable enumeration of them see Le Bergsonisme, by Julien Benda. 2 Republic, II, 388 E. (Translation by J. L. Davies, M.A., and D. Vaughan, M.A.). 3 Ibid., V, 452 D. 4 Laws (Grote's Translation, VII, 8030). 5 Poetics, V, 2 (Translation by W. Hamilton Fyfe). 6 Rhetoric, II, XII, 16 (Translation by J. H. Freese). 7 Coislinian Treatise (translated by Lane Cooper, Oxford, 1904). 8 On Style, III, 170. 9 De Oratore (II, lviii), translation by William Guthrie (Oxford, 1808), p. 252. 10 Institutiones Oratoriae, book VI, chap. III, 6, etc. 11 Ibid., 8. 12 Plutarch's Moralia (translated by W. W. Goodwin, Ph.D., edit. 1870, vol. III). Book II of the Sympiosiaca, Quest. 9 (p. 237). 13 Les Passions de l'Ame (edition: Paris, 1664, article CXXV): 14 Ibid. (Article CXXVI): "L'expérience aussi nous fait voir, qu'en toutes les rencontres qui peuvent produire ce Ris éclatant, qui vient du poulmon, il y a toujours quelque petit sujet de Haine, ou du moins d'admiration." 15 Op. cit. (translation), p. 198. "Laughter cannot be absolutely just. Nor should it be kind-hearted either." 16 The Temple ("The Church Porch."). 17 Human Nature (Molesworth Edition of Works, vol. IV, chap. IX, para. 13). 18 Leviathan, chap. VI. 19 Ethics, part IV, Prop. L Schol. 20 Ibid., part III, "Definitions and Emotions," XI. 21 Ibid., part IV, Prop. XLV Schol. 22 See note 30 of chap. II supra. 23 Spectator, No. 47. 24 Spectator, No. 371. 25 This is only alleged by the compiler of a contemporary MS. on Laughter, and edited by Poinsinet de Sivri. 26 Letter 144. 27 Polite Learning in Europe (1759), chap. XI. 28 Op. cit., p. 370: "Jamais le rire ne donne à la physiognomie une expression de sympathie et de bienveillance. . . . Tout au contraire, il fait grimacer le visage le plus harmonieux, il efface la beauté." 28a Ibid. : "Mais quelle que soit la cause qui le provoque [laughter], allez au fond, vous le trouverez constamment accompagné, qu'on se l'avoue ou non, d'une secrète satisfaction d'amour-propre, de je ne sais quel plaisir malin. Quiconque rit d'un autre, se croit en ce moment supérieur à lui par le côté où il l'envisage et qui excite son rire, et le rire est surtout l'expression du contentement qu'inspire cette superiorité réelle ou imaginaire." 29 Œuvres Completes, "Racine et Shakespeare," chap. II, Le Rire, p. 23: "Il faut que j'accorde un certain degré d'estime à la personne aux dépens de laquelle on prétend me faire rire." 30 The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (edit. 1872), p. 200. 31 Ibid., p. 210. 32 Ibid., pp. 207–208. 33 Ibid., p. 214. 34 The Emotions and the Will (4th edition, 1899, chap. XIV, "The Emotions," p. 257). 35 In an address before the Subsection of Psychology at the British Association, reported in Nature (Jan. 1, 1914, vol. XCII, p. 516). 37 In Dr. Wrench's discussion of the problem of laughter in his Grammar of Life (Heinemann, 1908, pp. 67–68) there is a description of the various kinds of laughter, to which I do not entirely subscribe, and in which laughter as successful or superior adaptation is mentioned as only one kind among many. I suggest that all laughter is of one kind — the expression of superior adaptation. But this difference in our views does not, as far as I am concerned, detract from the usefulness of the phrasing suggested by Dr. Wrench's analysis, and I have, therefore, adopted the suggestion. 38 Op. cit. 2 Op. cit., p. 36. 3 Ibid., p. 37. 4 An Essay on Laughter (London, 1902), pp. 143–144. See also Alex. Bain, Westminster Review, Oct., 1847, p. 55: "Laughter is a source of prodigious moral power; it is a weapon that can inflict pain and torture, and largely influences the actions of men." And the same author (English Composition and Rhetoric, London, 1888, part II, p. 236): "To be ourselves laughed at, or derided, is a severe infliction." See also Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 2, 12: "Men are angry with those who laugh, mock or scoff at them, for this is an insult. . . . But these acts must be of such a kind that they are neither retaliatory nor advantageous to those who commit them; for if they are, they then appear due to gratuitous insult." See also Cicero, Oratore, II, LVIII, who advises an orator to raise a laugh "because it lessens, confounds, hampers, frightens and confutes the opponent." 5 Op. cit., pp. 205–206. On p. 202 Darwin says: "The upper teeth are always exposed." 6 Anxious to explain even laughter as an evolved function, Darwin, in the work already quoted, tries to show that monkeys and apes laugh, but his argument is not convincing. One cannot help suspecting anthropomorphic interpretation in these cases of so-called animal laughter. Even if it were true, however, it would only show that among very sociable animals, like monkeys, beginnings were already traceable of the same unconscious processes that have taken place in men. 7 Darwin has a good deal to say in support of this. See The Expression of the Emotions, pp. 60 and 358. 8 Op. cit., p. 207. 2 Dreaming, Laughing and Blushing, by Sir Arthur Mitchell, K.C.B. (London, 1905), p. 101. 3 Westminster Review, October. 1847, article: "Wit and Humour," p. 39. 4 See Sully, op. cit., p. 180. 5 Op. cit., pp. 201 — 202. 6 Aristotle, Rhetoric, III. XVIII, 7. "As for jests, since they may sometimes be useful in debates, the advice of Gorgias was good — to confound the opponents' earnest with jest and their jest with earnest." See also Cicero (De Oratore , book II, LVIII, quoted under note 4, chapter IV.) 7 See Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, vol. LIX, 1929: "Some Collective Expressions of Obscenity in Africa. The A-Kamba," p. 318. 8 Othello, Act IV, Scene I. 9 The Emotions and the Will, p. 261 (note) and Westminster Review, p. 38. 1a Maximes: "Dans les malheurs de nos amis il y a toujours quelquechose qui nous plait." 2 Ethics, vol. I (edit., 1897), p. 383. See also Alexander Bain, English Composition and Rhetoric, part II, p. 237: "Among Savages a drowning man's struggles will be viewed with exultant laughter." 3 The Fijians (London, 1908), p. 96. 4 The History of Melanesian Society, vol. I, p. 46. 5 The Negro Races (London, 1907), p. 378. 6 Op. cit., p. 388. 7 The Land and Peoples of the Kasai, p. 272. 8 The Ila-speaking Peoples of Northern Rhodesia, vol. II, p. 344. 9 The Life of a South African Tribe, vol. II, pp. 247–248. 10 The Natives of British Central Africa, p. 233. 11 Op. cit., p. 229. 12 Essays (edit. London, 1884), German Wit: Heinrich Heine, pp. 82–83. 14 Across China on Foot, by E. J. Dingle (London, 1911), p. 93. 15 Ibid., p. 344. 16 J. H. Gray, China, vol. I, p. 53. 17 Century Magazine (New York, Oct., 1902), "The Sense of Humour in Children," pp. 959–960. 18 The Springs of Laughter, p. 95. 19 Ibid. 20 Op. cit., p. 102. 21 Op. cit., p. 106–107. 22 Op. cit., p. 133. 23 Op. cit., p. 168. 23a Mr. Chesterton in his article on "Humour" in vol. II of the 14th edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, uses the same example for a discussion of child laughter. But, although he has no lucid theory of his own, he is so anxious to express his hatred of the kind of theory propounded by Hobbes, that, as usual, he entirely caricatures the case of his opponent, and thereby merely reveals his own confusion and prejudice. He says, referring to the child's laughter at the cow jumping over the moon: "It is very hard for the most imaginative psychologist to believe that, when a baby bursts out laughing at the image of a cow jumping over the moon, he is really finding pleasure in the probability of the cow breaking her leg when she comes down again." Hobbes would, of course, never have maintained anything so far-fetched or foolish as Mr. Chesterton's suggested interpretation. But, unlike Mr. Chesterton, Hobbes would have claimed that there are occasions when a child can laugh cruelly. And the evidence given in chapter VI proves this to be both possible and common. 24 Diogenes Laertius (1–70, translated by R. D. Hicks, M.A.). Cleobulus also has a stricture against laughter at other people's expense. He says: "When men are being bantered, do not laugh at their expense, or you will incur their hatred" (Diogenes Laertius, I, 93). But here the stricture is inspired less by kindliness and good taste than by plain utilitarianism. 25 Mary A. Grant, The Ancient Rhetorical Theories of the Laughable (Madison, 1924), p. 37. 26 Ethics (translated by H. Rackham, M.A.), book IV, VIII, 3. 27 Ibid., IV, VIII, 6. 28 Ibid., IV, VIII, 10. 29 Mary A. Grant (Op. cit., p. 90). 30 De Oratore, II, LVIII and LI X. (Translation given supra.) 31 De Oratore, II, LX. Cicero repeats the joke of Appius as follows: "I will sup with you, said he, to my friend Sextius, who has but one eye, for I see there is a vacancy for me." In chap. LVIII Cicero says, "It is indecent to insult the miserable," and warns the orator against falling into the farcical character in 32 Symposiaca, book II, quest. I, 9. (For translation and edition see note 12, chap. III supra.) 33 Ibid., quest. I, 12. 34 Ibid., quest. I, 9. 2 Praxis und Theorie der Individualpsychologie (3rd edition), p. 5. "Die eingehendste Betrachtung ergibt nun, dass wir die seelischen Bewegungen aller Art am besten verstehen können, wenn wir als ihre allgemeinste Voraussetzung erkannt haben, dass sie auf ein Ziel der Ueberlegenheit gerichtet sind." 3 Ibid., p. 9: "Dem Kinde haftet während der Ganzen Zeit seiner Entwickling ein Gefühl der Minderwertigkeit in seinem Verhältnis zu den Eltern und zur Welt an." 4 Ibid., p. 12: "Der Besitz hereditär mindewertiger Organe, Organsysteme und Drüsen mit innerer Sekretion für das Kind in den Anfängen seiner Entwicklung eine Position schaffe, in der das sonst normale Gefühl der Schwäche und Unselbständigkeit ganz ungeheuer vertieft wird und sich zu einem tief empfundenen Gefühl der Minderwertigkeit auswächst." 5 Ibid., pp. 13–15. 6 Ibid., chapter 4, pp. 22–25. 7 Ibid., p. 9: "Dieses Gefühl der Minderwertigkeit erzeugt die beständige Unruhe des Kindes, seinem Betätigungsdrang, sein Rollensuchen, sein Kräftemessen, sein Vorbauen in die Zukunft und seine körperlichen und geistigen Vorbereitungen." 7a In regard to this, we should remember Hobbes's words in the Leviathan, where, speaking of laughter, he says: "And it is incident most to them that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves." To have made this remark, so prophetic of the discoveries of our advanced twentieth-century psychology, shows Hobbes to have been a psychologist of unusual power and perspicacity. 8 See chapter VI supra, note 21. 9 See Spencer's Education (edit. 1902, p. 13): "Look around and see how many men and women [you] can find in middle or later life who are thoroughly well. Only occasionally do we meet with an example of vigorous health continued to old age; hourly we meet with examples of acute disease, chronic ailment, general debility, premature decrepitude." The fact that Spencer was able to write this in 1861, seventy-one years ago, shows how long this state of prevailing debility has existed and has been noticeable to the observer. 10 In 1881 there were 23,275 medical practitioners, and the 11 Reported in the Sunday Times, Oct. 18th, 1931. 12 Will to Power (Authorised English Translation by A. M. Ludovici), vol. I, p. 74. And this explains the "pure" laughter of which Spinoza spoke (see chap. III supra). By this "pure" laughter I can only think Spinoza meant what I call subjective laughter, the laughter which appears to have no provocation from outside, but of which the Jew would be capable, because in Spinoza's age he had suffered so much. 13 See note 7 supra. |
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